Sudirman Cup has had a history of over 30 years, but the 2023 version (Suzhou, China, May 14-21) is one of the most dramatic if not THE most dramatic. Two reigning Olympics champions got injured and retired during quarterfinal matches, completely ending their teams’ hope. And the host China survived tough tests, first against Indonesia, then barely escaped Japan, then almost fell into the same hole against South Korea in the Final. Much is due to the the first match, mixed doubles, and the Chinese choice of mixed double pairs. Consequently, Chinese public opinion railed against the coaches; the coaches are not infallible, but the prevailing thought is wrong.
Ironically, China’s mixed doubles are considered China’s strongest point. Zheng Siwei/Huang Yaqiong are the best in the world and ranked No. 1 almost continuously for the past 5 years. The second pair Feng Yanzhe/Huang Dongping (Huang being the reigning Olympics champion) has a good record against all the major opponents not named Zheng/Huang. The third pair is young but with a lot of potential and just won the Asian Championship a few week back. So what can possibly go wrong?
The answer is that Zheng/Huang in 2023 are not as dominant as in 2022, either due to age or a drop in forms. During 2022 they were winning most matches 2:0, leaving opponents with little chance. But so far the short 2023 season has seen a lot of 2:1 and even comebacks. No doubt everybody senses that, including the Chinese coaches. In the group stage against Singapore HYKT/TWHJ, the first set Zheng/Huang were down 7:11, 9:15, 18:20, before winning 22:20. The second set was 21:19, not a cake walk either. HYKT/TWHJ were “winning” by fast exchanges at the net and quick smashes whenever possible. While it was just a group stage match, it foretold things to come.
The same strategy was employed even better by the Indonesian pair RR/WGE during the quarterfinals, as WGE was much taller than Huang and dominated the net more. Zheng/Huang had no chance in the first set, 13:21, and was down 9:13, 11:17, 14:19 in the second. Then Zheng/Huang hit fast and flat to RR/WGE, inducing many errors into the net. After losing the second set, RR/WGE lost their energy and quickly the third set.
The win is a must for China because Indonesia is the weakest in mixed doubles. Had Indonesia stole the first point, the whole thing could go 3:2 either way. The second match, men’s singles, Shi Yuqi vs Ginting, was still crucial. Shi has an excellent record against Ginting, but Indonesia picked Ginting because: 1. their last two meetings were 1:1; 2. Ginting is in good shape, just winning the Asian Championship; 3. the other Indonesian Christie plays better against Shi historically, but had lost in the group stage, so is probably not at his best. Ginting was leading the first set throughout, 15:9, 18:12, and 20:18, before running out of gas. There is a reason why Shi plays well against Ginting: both are attacking players, but Shi, being much taller, has a wider reach and better defense. Ginting tried to neutralize it by smashing at Shi’s body, which worked a couple of times in the first set, but no more as the match progressed. After Shi’s win, the women’s singles ran the course naturally.
Even though Zheng/Huang won, it sounded a warning bell for China, and the coaches must have realized that Zheng/Huang are no longer automatic and durable. Hence the pick of Feng/Huang against YK/YN of Japan. The Chinese public opinion denounces it as a wrong decision, but it is only a hindsight after Feng/Huang lost. The fact that Zheng/Huang are not at their 2022 peak and Feng/Huang had beaten YK/YN twice comfortably made it an easy and sensible choice.
In the match it was clear that Feng/Huang could have prevailed if Feng had been calmer. In the first set Feng/Huang was leading most of the time, caught up by YK/YN at the end, and Feng served out to give YK/YN a soon-converted set point. The second set Feng/Huang were leading all the way and won. The third set they were leading even more, 12:6, 17:11, 19:15, 20:18. Then Feng served out again at his match point. Feng’s hands were visibly shaken on TV and legs gave away left and right, so the loss was entirely predictable even before the last shuttle dropped. But in an alternate universe, Zheng/Huang could still have lost to Japan, then Feng/Huang would perform even worse against Korea, an even tougher opponent.
Three hours later, with Japan leading 2:1 came the most dramatic, everyone-talking-about match of the tournament: men’s doubles, Liu/Ou vs Hoki/Kobayashi. The first two sets were evenly contested. The third set Hoki/Kobayashi had the clear upper hand, leading 18:12, 19:13, 20:16. One more point, Japan in the Final. Then Liu/Ou scored the next 6 points to achieve the most improbable comeback ever in Sudirman Cup history. Did Hoki/Kobayashi choke? Not necessarily. Sure, they lost 6 straight points, including 4 match points, but they didn’t give away any silly errors; the credit should go to Liu/Ou, who managed to make zero mistakes in fast exchanges during those 6 crucial points. Contrast that to Feng/Huang in the mixed doubles in their own match points. If Hoki/Kobayashi surrendered a win, so did Feng/Huang 4 hours earlier. Still, the loss by Hoki/Kobayashi was more devastating, deflating the Japanese team and making the women’s doubles a nonissue.
So far so good for the Chinese coaches, despite the most scary drama to the Final. But their choice for the Final was the real problem, again notwithstanding the result.
Zheng/Huang to play was a no-brainer. They were rested and the best there is. Nobody would pick Feng/Huang or anybody else. But Shi for men’s singles was a gamble. Chen Yufei for women’s singles was also questionable, albeit justifiable.
Shi had played in the quarterfinal, coming back to beat Ginting. He played an even longer match in the semi, coming back to beat Naraoka, a mere 18 hours ago. All maximum pressure matches. Shi is the MVP of the Sudirman Cup 2023, even discounting the Final. But Shi has never been a stamina guy. While a tired Shi is still better than Lee YG of Korea, the Chinese coaches were running an unnecessary risk. It showed. The second set saw Lee much stronger than the first set, leading 7:1 early, and Shi visibly tiring. Had Lee stole the second set, he could have won the third set as well. China should have picked Li Shifeng, the reigning All-England champion. Li’s playing style is very consistent, nothing flashy, but makes few mistakes, a good match and favorite against any Korea men’s singles, the only weak spot for Korea. Li is no newbie either, having played in team events in 2021 and 2022 and performed competently at crucial stages.
Of course Shi did win, making the selection question moot. But why gambled when you had a sure hand? Especially considering what happened earlier, the mixed doubles match, Zheng/Huang vs Seo/Chae. After Seo/Chae won the see-saw first set, Zheng/Huang were clearly in shock, 3:9 right away in the second set. Credit to them to right the ship fast and mount another comeback. Still down 16:19 and 19:20, before winning the next 3 points to avert defeat. The third set Seo/Chae were eerily like RR/WGE of Indonesia.
So what is the moral here? First, based on their performance during the week, Zheng/Huang were no sure bet against YK/YN either. Second, had Zheng/Huang lost to YK/YN and China still went into the Final, China would surely pick Feng/Huang, who could lose to Seo/Chae as well. Third, Zheng/Huang are world No 1 for a reason: you have to play over 100% to beat them, and if you let the opportunity slip by, you will have no energy sustaining the third set. But fourth, had China lost the mixed doubles, Shi Yuqi would have played his third straight full pressure match in 3 days, No guarantee he would have enough energy or play better than Li Shifeng, especially when Lee YG would have been fully motivated.
The third match, Chen Yufei was a surprise pick against An SY. An SY is the best player in 2023, and Chen just lost meekly to Yamaguchi 18 hours earlier. China could have selected He Bingjiao, but the coaches probably reasoned like this: 1. Anybody is an underdog against An SY, Chen or He. 2. Every match is a new match, and past performance is no guarantee of future results. Case in point, Yamaguchi already lost twice in the tournament, but still beat Chen easily yesterday. 3. The fact that Chen lost fast actually meant she was still physically fresh. 4. Chen matches up OK against An. In terms of playing styles they are the same, rallying players, and both read each other’s shots well. Chen has the advantage of being taller and covering more space. An has the advantage of being younger and becoming faster. In recent matches An evolves by attacking more and winning. So the strategies used and executed would determine the outcome.
This match turned out to be quite telling in badminton thoughts. Chen arguably played the best and fastest in her life. Chen was a pure rallying player when she first came out. Then she improved attacking in 2019, which enabled her to threaten the best players. Yet in 2021 the Tokyo Olympics saw her reverting to the old defensive style in the Final and winning the Gold. She has then maintained the same passive mode ever since, losing more and more to the top opponents. But in the match against An she was attacking again, at the earliest chances, even starting from services and service returns. Such a strategy was so apparent and consistent that Chen used it even at the last five points of the match.
In comparison, An was passive until about the last 10 points of the match, by then it was too little too late. Not certain why, because An’s rise in 2023 coincides with her more frequent smashes. Maybe Chen’s attacking first made it hard for An to attack. Maybe it was her strategy to tire out Chen before attacking in the third set. Or maybe An didn’t play to her full potential because of the pressure with Korea down 0:2? Regardless, one can argue that Chen played her best, and An did not.
One last point: why did Chen’s attack win, while Tai TY lost to An in the quarterfinal, considering Tai is a stronger attacking player than Chen? One explanation obviously is every match is a new match. And expectation and strategies differ among players. But another reason may be that Chen’s and Tai’s attacks are different. Chen’s attacks are mostly smashes. Tai uses tight dropshots at the net coupled with smashes. Tai’s deceptive net shots are less a threat to An because An is willing to run. When you drop a netshot from the back court, if your opponent retrieves it, she will likely return with a net shot, and you must rush to net from the back, spending a lot of energy, so Tai naturally makes more errors at the net, which happened at the last points in her Olympics Final and again in the quarterfinal against An. In contrast, at least in this match, Chen attacked early, which saved her energy, and she intercepted the shuttlecock early and was able to smash often from mid court, which was more effective. In other occasions she pulled An to one edge of the court and then smashed/dropped wide cross court, another scoring formula. In sum, Chen’s win was due to her proactive strategy and An’s inability to adjust. It will be quite interesting to see whether Chen keeps it up, or returns to the old, boring style in the future.
