COVID-19 Consensuses in China

China faced a tough time in Dec 2019/Jan 2020 and again three year later.  The difference is that for the first one people didn’t know what to expect, but for the second one the public do, even when the loss in 2022/2023 will be much higher. 

Unlike my Nov 1, 2022 blog posited when there was no consensus on DZ at the time, in less than 2 months’ time a few consensuses have taken hold in China.  The first one is that DZ did save lives.  The contrast between Oct 2022 and Dec 2022 couldn’t have been starker in terms of infections and deaths.  But the second one is that opening up is the only way going forward.  DZ was too costly.  Even DZ supporters, a significant number, who oppose the current policy, admit that once it is opened, it is not possible to return to DZ.  The third consensus is that most people can recover at home, hence the fear factor is much diminished.  The fourth consensus is that many will die, but that is the cost of moving beyond the pandemic.

The fourth consensus is the reality nonetheless vexing the public.  Should or could the government have done anything, or done better, to prepare for the shift from DZ or to lessen the impact?  The only one definitive is that the government should have pushed vaccination harder (Dec 2, 2022 and Dec 10, 2022 blogs).  Other than this is speculative.

The biggest complaint right now it is the government moved away from DZ too quickly, without a smooth transition to opening up.  It does seem like it, but the actionable question is: what exactly can the government do to make the transition smooth besides vaccination?  There have been debates on this in the media.  A school of thought is that you have either DZ or full relaxation, but no middle ground.  If DZ is a 9, what the rest of world is doing is 1, then the current China is 2, but there is no 5 or 6, because 5/6 is not feasible to begin with.  In other words, little can the government do to satisfy those who want the safety of DZ minus the restrictions.  Just have to bite the bullet.  Short-term pain is better than long-term. 

The other position is that we should have tried 5/6.  Even if it doesn’t work, the weeks and months of trying it will soften the blow going into 2.  5/6 presumably means very limited lockdowns, less frequent RNA testing, health code requirements going into crowded places, etc, which my previous blog had hoped for.  We will never know the answer now as it was never attempted.  Still, DZ being ineffective against Omicron didn’t stop the government from doing it for most of 2022, then why did it go straight to 2 without ever trying 5/6?  

The last position is that the government failed to prepare the necessary medicines to handle the massive infections, such as ibuprofen, etc.  But this kind of situation happens all the time around the world, and no country or government can avoid it.  According to a famous US general and President, plans are useless, planning is essential.  If you want everything prepared well before you do anything, which is subjective and easily turned into circular thinking, you will never do anything since you can never prepare everything well.  China is a big country with 1.4 billion people, so bound to have shortage somewhere sometime no matter what.  The bottleneck is seldom the production but the distribution and panic buying.  Indeed, the first two weeks saw the most empty shelves, which in late Dec is far less an issue. 

Even though we now have vaccines and Omicron is less deadly, a situation better than 2020 and 2021, everything happens all at once, family members are sick altogether, creating a new danger.  While most people stay home, even 0.5% going to the hospitals will squeeze the system, leading to unnecessary deaths.  If you didn't have Omicron before you went to the hospital, once you did, you would have it.  The ventilation systems in Chinese buildings could be upgraded to avoid long distance infections, perhaps another area the government should have done better.  At this rate China appears to aim for 2-3 months to go through what the rest of the world went through in the last 2-3 years in order to move past COVID-19.  The exact infection and death numbers are impossible to come by because they are too fragmented and localized, so have to wait for months and check the excess death data for 2022 and 2023.  Local cities and provinces are giving very high numbers which are only surveys and estimates.  People use home Ag tests and don’t report their results, or have the symptoms but don’t do Ag tests, so it is impossible to tell if all with the cold/flu symptoms are Omicron infections.  This winter is cold in much of China, so a busy common cold/flu season as well, which would infect 200 million or more people.  Worse, China doesn’t have a tradition of tracking cold/flu.

There is abundance of information about COVID-19 experiences and death announcements in the Chinese media, which helps foster the consensuses and educate the public.  The only thing missing in almost all cases is that it would have been better and more informative if their vaccinated status is shared.  So far of all the dozens if not >100 death reports, I have seen only one ever mentioning vaccination status (not vaccinated).  For this round of infections vaccination is unfortunately too late for many, but 6 month from now when the immunity wanes, it will help to vaccinate and boost sooner, again.  How China recovers from these tough 2-3 months will be closely watched.