A six-part documentary同心抗“疫”, loosely translated as “Fighting the pandemic together”, premiered
on Chinese CCTV1 from Sept 2 to 7. It is
about how China fought the COVID-19 outbreak, mostly in Wuhan, and each episode
is about 50 min long with a separate focus.
Episode 1 is on the government/policy level. Episode 2 is medical/hospital response. Episode 3 is the Wuhan local community
level. Episode 4 is how the rest of
China supported Wuhan and Hubei. Episode
5 is on international cooperation. Episode
6 is summarizing people’s war against COVID-19 in China. The footages had been shown before since Jan,
so no one will get any surprise if he/she has followed it from the start. An improvement could have been adding the
dates and times to many footages in the documentary. Another is to inject a scientific discovery
and research angle, although this might be too nerdy for the mass. Overall it provides a systematic overview and
a record of many statistics.
The documentary showed/confirmed how
badly Wuhan hospitals were overwhelmed in late Jan. On Jan 22, 2020, one hospital had 1700 people
in for checkup. That is just one of the
many hospitals in Wuhan. One can imagine
what they looked like after Jan 23.
Indeed, episode 2 and others show plenty of footages. On around Jan 28 there were 15K city-wide
emergency calls, as patients were still waiting to get admitted to hospitals,
which were >100% full. This is
entirely predictable and explained in my earliest COVID-19 blogs. No city in the world can handle this kind of crisis
or panicking, not Wuhan, not NYC. Some
issues might have been preventable if planned better, but some were inevitable,
as both the disease and the lockdown were new to everybody. The saddest part is that most people jamming
the hospitals around Jan 23 were likely not COVID-19 positive going in, but
many would get infected there through superspreading. Because of this shortage in medical
attention, the average/median time from symptom development to hospital
admission in the early days were 9.8 days, which was too late for many patients. A heartbreaking story is that a 90-year-old
mother looked after her 64-year-old son who was infected but couldn’t be
admitted. So they stayed at the
observation space in a hospital for days, when his other family members were too
scared to join him. His mother said, I
am 90 years old, I don’t care. The son
was finally admitted to ICU but died on the same day, and his family hid the
news from the mother for a long time.
RNA testing was also limited. Although no complete data were given, from the
documentary it appears that tests in Wuhan around Jan 23 were on the order of merely
hundreds per day, and surpassed 10K only at the end of Jan. This is a far cry from the current 5 million daily
capacity in China. Considering that the
initial kits might not be as good as the later versions, testing labs were
still being built, and false negatives persist even today around the globe, the
insufficiency in testing was not surprising but consequential, and explains why
so many infections in Jan were not diagnosed quickly enough. In retrospect, identifying the virus so quickly might even have been a curse: RNA testing then became the gold standard in diagnosis, but it might not be optimized or sensitive enough for the newly infected, hence missing patients after Jan 11.
Shortages in hospital beds were overcome
by Feb 6, after Wuhan hospitals reorganized their facilities, two new field
hospitals were constructed to take the severe cases, and 16 shelter hospitals set
up for 12K mild cases. Another shortage
is masks and PPEs, which partly contributed to 3000 medical staff in Wuhan
being infected, ~ 10 died. There were in
total only 100K N95 masks in China, and on Jan 26, 2020 there were 12.5K PPEs,
but the daily need was 100K. On Jan 25 China
made only 8 million surgical masks per day, when the whole country pretty much had
mandated masks in public. This is well-known
in China: in late Jan it was practically impossible to find a mask in any
store.
Thus, all information pointed to China
caught surprised and ill-prepared for COVID-19.
This is the only thing China didn’t do well and could have done better, partly
related to the question whether a lesser lockdown might have sufficed in
Wuhan. Not the so-called coverup, which
is nonsensical based on all scientific evidence. Certainly blows apart the ludicrous allegation
that China used COVID-19 as a weapon. In
March and April, when the West was dealing with COVID-19 itself and found masks
and PPEs wanting, politicians and media all blamed China hoarding materials for
profits. Even Intercept made a big fuss
about the US exporting medical supplies to China in Feb and March, though not
explicitly stating its point, as it knows the underlying premise was wrong. It was purely an economical play, not to mention
humanitarian. In economy, when there is
no need, actual or perceived, it is a waste to produce. Even China, which provides the most such
things for the whole world, didn’t have much in store in Jan. Then, how could China use whichever as
weapons? And in those early days, should
China not import, or should other countries not sell?
Imports were a drop in the bucket
anyway. By Feb 22, 2020, China produced 110 million surgical masks per day, even more later. As a result, of the 43K doctors and nurses
from other provinces going to Wuhan and Hubei, none was known to be
infected. Unfortunately, not shown in
the documentary but well reported previously, a handful of them died due to
stress. In addition to the medical
staff, there were over 120K other people going into Wuhan and Hubei during the
lockdown, building hospitals and performing other essential tasks. Wuhan was not let hanging dry by any means, stories
of people volunteering, helping others abound.
The documentary offers only a glimpse of those.
In the West though, few such stories
were reported or shown, if ever, only how people were angry. Wuhan has 10 million people. Even if only 1% are angry, that is 100K, hence
if you want it, you will find it. If I were
locked down for 76 days (Jan 23 to April 8), I would be angry too, but this anger
is not that kind of anger implied in the West.
In Jan and Feb most Western reporting derided Chinese responses. When on Mar 10, 2020 Xi Jinping visited
Wuhan, Western news cried that he wanted to claim success and credits, with many
commentators predicting it would be his “Mission Accomplished” moment. Six months later, has any of them had any
self reflection? While few knows for
sure how the policies were decided, and we will never know if the lockdown
Wuhan got were the best measure possible, nobody could have ordered the
lockdown except Xi Jinping. The lockdown
achieved its objectives, and the cost in China, no matter how one prices it,
pales in comparison to those in many other countries.
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